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1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the infancy of the global drone1 market, deal values have achieved
record-breaking status in recent years, exceeding USD $570 million in 2015 in the
commercial sector alone. In 2016, deal values were expected to exceed USD $1
billion, and by 2022, USD $2 billion.2 Indeed, drones represent today’s ‘‘most
dynamic growth sector of the world aerospace industry.”3 With this growth,
coupled with increasingly sophisticated technology, the potential for surveillance
will reach its greatest heights; yet, surveillance by the State, or ‘‘Big Brother,” is
no longer the sole concern. As drone use increases, surveillance by corporate and
recreational actors, which will be of focus here, will be cause for particular
consternation.4
The drone, like digital information, the Internet, social media, and heat-
detecting cameras, is just another example of a form of technology raising
significant privacy concerns.5 In 2012, in Jones v. Tsige,6 Justice Sharpe of the
Ontario Court of Appeal (‘‘ONCA”) stated:
. . . technological change poses a novel threat to a right of privacy that
has been protected for hundreds of years by the common law under
various guises and that, since 1982 and the Charter, has been
recognized as a right that is integral to our social and political order.7
Despite Justice Sharpe’s contention, this threat is not novel. Indeed, in 1890,
prompted by privacy concerns associated with the rise of instantaneous
photography, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis recognized privacy concerns
introduced by technology.8
1 As opposed to commonly used ‘‘UAV”, or unmanned air vehicle, the term ‘‘drone” will
be used in this paper, as it is an all-encompassing term referring to any vehicle operating
on surfaces or in the air without someone onboard to control it, includingmodel aircraft:
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Drones in Canada: Will the
Proliferation of domestic drone use in Canada raise new concerns for privacy?,” Report
by the Research Group of the OPC (Ottawa: OPC, March 2013), online: <https://
www.priv.gc.ca> at 2 [OPC—Research Group Report]. See Section 2.1.1, below, for a
more comprehensive definition.
2 DroneII, ‘‘Drone Investment Trends 2016,” online: <https://www.droneii.com>;
Grand View Research, ‘‘Commercial Drone Market Worth $2.07 Billion by 2022”
(January 2016), online: <www.grandviewresearch.com/press-release>.
3 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Surveillance Drones: Privacy
Implications of the Spread of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS) in Canada,” A
Report to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, under the 2013-2014
Contributions Program, by Ciara Bracken-Roche et al. (Ottawa: OPC, 30 April 2014),
online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca> at 8 [Bracken-Roche].
4 Graham Mayeda, ‘‘My Neighbour’s Kid Just Bought a Drone . . . New Paradigms for
Privacy Law in Canada” (2015) 35:1 NJCL 59 at 68 [Mayeda].
5 R. v. Craig, 2016 BCCA 154, 2016 CarswellBC 918 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 54.
6 2012 ONCA 32, 2012 CarswellOnt 274 (Ont. C.A.) [Jones].
7 Ibid, at para. 68.
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Although the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (the ‘‘OPC”)
recognizes that new technologies hold ‘‘great promise” for Canada’s economic
growth, it also recognizes the privacy risks that drones represent.9 As drones
become more commonplace, privacy invasions are bound to occur in one form or
another. For that reason, those on the other side of the camera must understand
their potential avenues for legal recourse. By examining how drones fit into the
regulatory landscape, this paper seeks to give light to such avenues, as well as
identifying gaps in protection.
To that end, Section 2 will define drones, with a focus on their features and
applications. Subsequently, the privacy risks posed by drones will be considered.
In Section 3, the legal framework governing drone operation in Canada will be
examined. Specifically, drone-specific laws, Canada’s private sector privacy
legislation, and the common law will be canvassed.
As this paper will illustrate, the Canadian legal system has thus far failed to
provide a clear or easily accessible avenue for recourse to those suffering privacy
violations as a result of drone surveillance, particularly in public spaces. Beyond
statutory deficiencies, the ‘‘various guises”10 by which the common law has
protected privacy over the past century have proven inadequate. While the
introduction of actionable privacy torts has significantly improved the prospect
for recovery, a remedy remains illusory in most scenarios and most provinces.
This paper concludes by calling upon the legislature to enhance privacy
protection in ‘‘the dawn of the age of the drone.”11
2. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: DRONES VS. PRIVACY
2.1 What is a ‘‘Drone”?
2.1.1 Features and Capabilities
Drones, a significant development in robotic technology,12 refer to any
vehicle capable of operating in the air without someone onboard to control it.13
Drones vary in size, shape, and form, ranging from model aircraft, to mini-
8 SamuelWarren & Louis Brandeis, ‘‘The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4:5 Harv LRev 193 at
193 [Warren & Brandeis].
9 OPC—Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 1; Office of the Privacy Commissioner
of Canada, ‘‘Study on the State of Disruptive Technologies: Submission to the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology” (Ottawa: OPC,
18 June 2015), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca> [OPC —Disruptive Technologies].
10 Jones, supra note 6 at para. 68.
11 Des Butler, ‘‘The Dawn of the Age of the Drones: An Australian Privacy Law
Perspective” (2014) 37:2 UNSW Law Journal 434 [Butler].
12 PaulD.M.Holden, ‘‘FlyingRobots andPrivacy inCanada” (2016) 14Can JL&Tech65
at 65 [Holden].
13 The term ‘‘drone” canbe further subdivided into (i) ‘‘UAV”or unmanned aerial vehicles;
(ii) ‘‘UAS” or unmanned air systems; (iii) ‘‘RPAS” or remote piloted aircraft systems;
and (iv) ‘‘Model Aircraft.” While there are slight differences, the first three terms can
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helicopters used by enforcement agencies, to large plane-sized aircraft sent into
war zones.14 As such, drones, which are typically operated by remote operation,
can fly at low enough altitudes to trespass, or at high enough altitudes to fly
alongside manned aircraft.15 Due to their flexibility, low cost, and unique
capabilities, for many applications, drones represent a desirable alternative to
manned flights, which has expanded their use.16
As a form of surveillance, drones are persistent, highly targeted, and
inexpensive; drones can be deployed on demand, can often stay in the air for
longer durations than manned aircraft, and can cover vast and remote areas.
Drones are often equipped with advanced technologies including high-power
zoom lenses, radar technologies, video analytics, and facial recognition
technology.17 Drones can even be fitted with equipment that impersonates cell
phone towers, allowing drones to intercept text messages and record
conversations. The United States (‘‘U.S.”) Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency provides an apt example of drone technology. This agency
has developed a 1.8 gigapixel video camera for drones, which is capable of
tracking sixty-five objects of interest from an altitude of more than 4,500
kilometres. With this camera, nothing can move within a forty square metre
radius without being sighted by the camera.18
2.1.2 Drone Applications
From Facebook to automobile navigation systems to clinical trials, the
applications made possible by the combination of information with computing
technology are numerous. Drones, which represent only one example of such
technology, have many recognized and potential applications, which are only
expected to multiply.19 Indeed, drones have the potential to benefit public20 and
essentially be used interchangeably, while model aircraft are used exclusively for
recreational purposes: OPC — Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 2.
14 Ibid.
15 Holden, supra note 12 at 70; Bracken-Roche, supra note 3 at 8.
16 Martin F. Sheehan & Michael Parrish, ‘‘Regulation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(‘‘Drones”) in Canada,” Fasken Martineau LLP, online: < http://www.fasken.com/
drones-canada> [Sheehan & Parrish].
17 Facial recognition technology enables drones to recognize and track personal attributes,
including height, age, gender, and skin colour: OPC — Research Group Report, supra
note 1 at 3-4.
18 Matthew L. Burow, ‘‘The Sentinel Clouds Above the Nameless Crowd: Protecting
Anonymity fromDomestic Drones” (2013) New Eng J Crim & Civ Confinement 427 at
430 [Burow].
19 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 12.
20 Althoughpublic actors are not the focus here, it should be noted that beyondwell-known
military purposes, drones are used by the public sector for varied purposes, including
intelligence gathering, object targeting, public safety operations, law enforcement,
border patrol, emergency services, and commercial aerial imaging: Bracken-Roche,
supra note 3 at 16.
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private actors alike with their diverse aerially-deployed sensor suites and
software solutions.21 For our purposes, commercial and recreational applications
will be of focus here.
2.1.2.1 Commercial Applications
Although private sector drone usage is fairly restricted at present, the OPC
views drones as an increasingly practical commercial tool.22 Drones are
extremely versatile; drones have been used for activities as varied as navigating
the Arctic, delivering pesticides and fertilizers, monitoring the health of crops,
monitoring wildlife, and aerial real estate photography.23 Already, Google and
Facebook are contemplating incorporating drone technology into various
business applications, including leveraging their networks to communicate
Internet and wireless bandwidth signals in parts of the world currently
inaccessible by land-based communication networks. Google has also
expressed interest in using drone technology’s systematic aerial surveillance for
its Google Maps initiatives.24 Amazon, as widely publicized, plans to use drones
as delivery vehicles.25 Thus far, ‘‘ambulance drones” have been used to transport
defibrillators to heart attack victims and drones have been used to deliver pizza
in New Zealand.26
The potential applications for drones by corporate actors are seemingly
endless.27 The OPC contemplates drones being used for infrastructure inspection,
digital mapping, air quality management and control, and broadcast services.28
Academics have contemplated the use of drones for the purposes of acquiring
evidence for civil and criminal proceedings.29 However, while drones will clearly
facilitate positive outcomes never previously imagined, with their facial
recognition software and imaging capabilities, drones can also be used
invasively by paparazzi photographers, for stalking, or for industrial
espionage.30
21 TimothyM. Ravich, ‘‘Courts in the Drone Age,” 42:2 N Ky L Rev 161 at 166 [Ravich].
22 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 5.
23 Holden, supra note 12 at 69.
24 Bracken-Roche, supra note 3 at 20.
25 Sheehan & Parrish, supra note 16.
26 Kevin Lui, ‘‘Watch Domino’s Pull Off the World’s First Commercial Pizza Delivery by
Drone,” Fortune (16 November 2016), online: <http://www.fortune.com>; Sherry
Baxter, ‘‘Reasonable Doubt: What you need to know about drones in Canada,” The
Georgia Straight (22 July 2016), online: <http://www.straight.com> [Baxter].
27 Bracken-Roche, supra note 3 at 15.
28 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 5.
29 Ravich, supra note 21 at 161.
30 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 5; Holden, supra note 12 at 69.
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2.1.2.2 Recreational Applications
In addition to commercial applications, the recreational use of drones by
individuals is on the rise. Beyond obvious purposes, such as photography, drones
have been used for unexpected activities, such as political activism. In Australia,
for example, activists deployed drones to gather video intelligence on an
industrial livestock operation.31 Drones have also been involved in criminal
activities, assisting in the smuggling of drugs across borders and of contraband
into prisons.32
The OPC notes that recreational drones are unique; they are low in cost,
highly capable, and no license is required to operate them. To illustrate, the OPC
cited the MeCam Flying Copter Camera, which was expected to cost a mere $49
and to come equipped with video recording capabilities, allowing footage to be
shared on social media.33 The Walmart website contains similar examples. The
Air Hogs Helix Sentinel Drone, for example, retails for $279.99, offers a high
definition 120-degree wide-angle lens camera, 720p Wi-Fi streaming capabilities,
a four gigabyte memory card to store footage, and allows for live streaming for
up to two smart devices. The Polaroid P300 HD Live Streaming Drone, which
retails for $169.98, has a maximum flight height of over one hundred twenty
metres, maximum speeds of up to thirty-two kilometres per hour, as well as a
high-definition camera that allows for remote adjustment of the camera angle.34
While both of the Walmart models above weigh more than 250 grams, and
are therefore now regulated by the CARs,35 drones weighing less than 250 grams,
which remain unregulated, are also highly capable. Take the racing drone
Walkera Rodeo, for example, which is available on Amazon.ca for $285.36 This
drone is equipped with a 600TVL night-vision camera capable of recording with
high-definition resolution and has an astounding control range of up to 800
metres.37 As evidenced by the examples above, recreational drones weighing
above and below 250 grams are both highly accessible and well-equipped with
advanced technology.
2.2 The Risks Drones Pose to Privacy
As the foregoing section illustrates, drones have numerous capabilities and
applications. While drones can certainly be used for positive outcomes, there is
nevertheless a risk that drone technology can be used to cause harm. This section
31 Bracken-Roche, supra note 3 at 17.
32 Baxter, supra note 26.
33 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 5-6.
34 Walmart, ‘‘Vehicles & Remote Control”, online: <www.walmart.ca>.
35 These new regulations will be discussed in detail in Section 3.1.1, below..
36 Amazon, ‘‘Walkera Rodeo150 Racing Quadcopter DEVO 7 Transmitter 5.8G FPV
600TVL Camera by Walkera,” online: <https://www.amazon.ca>.
37 See Drone Arena, ‘‘Top 10 Camera Drones under 250 Grams” (29 July 2016), online:
<www.rcdronearena.com>.
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aims to identify the privacy risks posed by drones. To understand drones in that
context, however, it is necessary to first understand the legal concept of privacy.
To that end, the development of privacy as a concept, privacy’s unsettled
definition, and the various recognized forms of privacy will be considered here.
2.2.1 What is Privacy?
2.2.1.1 The Development of Privacy as a Concept
In early times, as long as curtains were drawn, no one could see what went on
behind castle walls without physically intruding. For that reason, the early roots
of privacy law are found in the law of trespass.38 Warren and Brandeis
eloquently described the evolution of privacy rights in their influential essay,
‘‘The Right to Privacy.” As Warren and Brandeis explained, initially, trespass vi
et armis protected against physical interference with life or property. Later, upon
recognition of the emotional nature of humankind, the law protected against
battery and assault. The laws of nuisance and defamation followed, as regard for
human emotions extended the scope of ‘‘personal immunity” beyond the body to
include one’s reputation.39
Within this context, Warren and Brandeis applauded the common law’s
ability to adapt:
. . . thoughts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal recognition,
and the beautiful capacity for growth which characterizes the common
law enabled the judges to afford the requisite protection, without the
interposition of the legislature.40
In response to innovations of the time,41 Warren and Brandeis called for the
next stage of common law development: recognition of the right ‘‘to be let
alone.”42 Within Canadian and American legal scholarship, this right is
considered the historical starting point for privacy, although it is important to
note that the right to be let alone differs from the concept of ‘‘privacy” in certain
ways.43 In some respects, the right to be let alone is broader than privacy, as it
demands freedom from interference generally, as opposed to interference with
38 R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, 2004 CarswellOnt 4351, 2004 CarswellOnt 4352 (S.C.C.), at
para. 15 [Tessling].
39 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8 at 194.
40 Ibid at 195.
41 These innovations included instantaneous photographs and invasive journalism, and
mechanical devices that threatened to ‘‘make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered
in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops’”: ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Notably, since Warren and Brandeis introduced the concept in 1890, it has since
developed into four distinct torts in the U.S.: (i) intrusion upon seclusion; (ii) public
disclosure of embarrassing facts; (iii) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in
the public eye; and (iv) appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness for the
defendant’s advantage: William L. Prosser, ‘‘Privacy” (1960) 48:3 Cal L Rev 383 at 389.
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privacy specifically; at the same time, the right to be let alone is narrower than
privacy, as it fails to capture the disclosure of private information.44
2.2.1.2 An Unsettled Definition
Although privacy has long been considered worthy of constitutional
protection due to its integral relationship to an ‘‘individual’s relationship with
the rest of society and the State,”45 the importance of privacy appears to be more
readily agreed upon than its nature or scope. In R. v. Dyment46, Justice La Forest
held that privacy within the context of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms47 is essential to the wellbeing of the individual and has a
profound impact on public order. In R. v. O’Connor, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
observed that privacy is ‘‘an essential component of what it means to be free.”48
Several decades ago, prominent philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson asserted
that ‘‘the most striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to
have any clear idea what it is.”49 Indeed, there are several competing definitions
of privacy, many of which differ substantially,50 although there is widespread
agreement that privacy is a dignitary interest, much like reputation.51
Nevertheless, despite the continuing lack of consensus with respect to what
precisely privacy means, and which specific events should be actionable, there
appears to be broad agreement that privacy encompasses two broad dimensions:
(i) freedom from unwanted intrusion into private affairs and spaces; and (ii)
freedom from unwanted disclosure of private information.52 With the
surveillance capabilities of drones, it is the former that is of most concern here.
2.2.1.1 Three Categories of Privacy
In R. v. Spencer,53 the Supreme Court of Canada (‘‘SCC”) recognized the
lack of consensus regarding privacy’s nature and limits, noting that privacy is
‘‘admittedly a ‘broad and somewhat evanescent concept.’”54 Evanescence
44 Holden, supra note 12 at 75-76.
45 Jones, supra note 6 at para 39.
46 1988 CarswellPEI 73, 1988 CarswellPEI 7, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.) at 427 [Dyment],
as cited in Jones, supra note 6 at para. 40.
47 Part I of theConstitutionAct, 1982, being ScheduleB to theCanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982,
c. 11 [Charter].
48 1995CarswellBC 1098, 1995CarswellBC 1151, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.) at para. 113,
as cited in Jones, supra note 6 at para. 43.
49 Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘‘The Right to Privacy” (1975) 4:4 Philosophy & Public Affairs
295 at 295, as cited inChrisD.L.Hunt, ‘‘TheCommonLaw’sHodgepodgeProtection of
Privacy” (2015) 66 UNBLJ 161 at 161-162 [Hunt].
50 Holden, supra note 12 at 75.
51 Hunt, supra note 49 at 172.
52 Ibid at 162-163.
53 2014 CarswellSask 342, 2014 CarswellSask 343, 2014 SCC 43 (S.C.C.) [Spencer].
54 Ibid at para. 35.
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notwithstanding, to serve as analytical tools, the SCC recognized three categories
of privacy interests, each of which, at least in principle, can be infringed by both
intrusions and disclosures.55 These categories, developed in Charter
jurisprudence and adopted by the ONCA in Jones56 upon creation of
Ontario’s new tort of intrusion upon seclusion,57 are territorial, personal, and
informational privacy.58 According to the SCC, these categories are not
mutually-exclusive and often overlap.59
Territorial privacy is said to protect the home, as well as other spaces where
individuals enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy. Personal privacy is based
on bodily integrity and protects an individual’s right not to be touched or to have
information disclosed that one wishes to keep concealed. Lastly, informational
privacy addresses the ‘‘thorny issue of how much information about ourselves
and activities we are entitled to shield from the curious eyes of the State.”60
2.2.1.1.1 Informational Privacy: Further Expansion
To expand upon informational privacy, the SCC cited three further
overlapping understandings of informational privacy: secrecy, privacy as
control, and privacy as anonymity.61 While the latter, anonymity, will be
considered in greater detail in Section 2.2.2.3.2, the former two understandings
will be considered here. The first, secrecy, refers to the retention of private
information, such as the expectation of patients that their medical information
will be held in confidence by their physicians.62 In Jones, the ONCA cited privacy
theorist Alan Westin, who defined privacy as control as the ‘‘claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others.”63 In the Charter
context, Justice Sopinka asserted that privacy as control is the ‘‘biographical core
of personal information which individuals in a free and democratic society would
wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state.”64 This
55 Hunt, supra note 49 at 163-164.
56 Jones, supra note 6 at para. 41.
57 Discussed in greater detail in Section 3.2.4.1, below.
58 Spencer, supra note 53 at para. 35.
59 Ibid at para. 35.
60 Jones, supra note 6 at para. 41; see also Tessling, supra note 38 at paras. 19-23; Dyment,
supra note 46 at 428-429; R. v. B. (S.A.), 2003 SCC 60, 2003 CarswellAlta 1525, 2003
CarswellAlta 1526 (S.C.C.) at para. 16.
61 Spencer, supra note 53 at para. 38.
62 See McInerney v. MacDonald, 1992 CarswellNB 247, 1992 CarswellNB 63, [1992] 2
S.C.R. 138 (S.C.C.) at 149, as cited in Spencer, ibid at para. 39.
63 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (London: The Bodley Head, 1967) at 7, as cited in
Jones, supra note 6 at 41.
64 R. v. Plant, 1993 CarswellAlta 566, 1993 CarswellAlta 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 at 293, as
cited in Tessling, supra note 38 at para. 26.
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‘‘biographical core”65 includes ‘‘intimate details of the lifestyle and personal
choices,” for example.66
2.2.2 Applying the Legal Concept of Privacy to Drones
Despite lacking consensus with respect to privacy’s precise definition, it is
possible to draw conclusions regarding privacy risks posed by drones using the
SCC’s analytical tools mentioned above. Of the three categories, drones pose the
greatest risk to informational privacy, although territorial and personal privacy
can also be affected.
Whether privacy concerns are invoked, and precisely which privacy concerns
are invoked, depends largely on the purpose for which drones are used, the
context and location of use, and the type of technology employed; these factors
affect the extent and type of ‘‘personal information”67 captured.68 This idea is
aptly described in the following comment by the OPC, which developed an
interest in drone technology in 2010:
. . . privacy risks arise from the unique combination of capabilities
incorporated into evolving [drone] applications — namely that they
couple powerful imaging payloads (high-resolution, infrared, night
vision), remote command capability (adding a covert potential) and the
ability to linger for periods of time. Where [drones] are in operation,
proximity of [the] device to [the] subject and the optimal power of
imaging will clearly raise privacy concerns, quite independently of
[drones] as a standalone device on their own.69
While intentional surveillance is of obvious concern, the inadvertent
collection of data by drones is also intensifying concerns about the
preservation and protection of individual and collective privacy.70 Indeed, even
drones not used for surveillance collect large amounts of environmental data,
which can result in individuals being captured in the background inadvertently.71
65 Notably, Spencer is argued to have ‘‘shrivelled” this conception of the ‘‘biographical
core,”making it only one factor ofmany to be considered: Chris Hunt &MicahRankin,
‘‘R v. Spencer: Anonymity, the Rule of Law, and the Shrivelling of the Biographical
Core” (2015) 61:1 McGill Law Journal 194 at 218 [Hunt & Rankin].
66 Tessling, supra note 38 at para. 26.
67 Using the definition in Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act,
information is ‘‘personal”when there is a possibility of identification,whether aloneor in
combination with other information: S.C. 2000, c. 5, s. 2(1) [PIPEDA]; see also OPC—
Disruptive Technologies, supra note 9; see also Gordon v. Canada (Minister of Health),
2008 FC 258, 2008 CarswellNat 522, 2008 CarswellNat 6510 (F.C.A.).
68 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 12.
69 Office of thePrivacyCommissioner ofCanada, ‘‘OPCcomment toTransportCanadaon
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” (Ottawa: OPC, 27 August 2015), online: <https://
www.priv.gc.ca> [OPC - Comment to Transport Canada].
70 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 12.
71 Butler, supra note 11 at 434; Holden, supra note 12 at 69.
388 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [15 C.J.L.T.]
This Section will proceed by first considering the privacy consequences of
inadvertent data collection by drones. Subsequently, the use of data mining,
which is increasing the amount of personal information captured by drones, will
be considered. Finally, the risks that drones pose to privacy in public and to
anonymity will be reviewed.
2.2.2.1 Inadvertent Data Collection
Justice Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is an
advocate for surveillance, at least where surveillance is used to prevent criminal
or terrorist assaults. In his view, the deterrence effect, in such cases, outweighs
any intrusion.72 While Justice Posner’s contention may be true in the public
safety and security context, it is impossible to deny the fact that mass
surveillance, whether for public safety initiatives or otherwise, undoubtedly
captures large amounts of environmental data, including personally sensitive
information.73 Furthermore, as noted above, even drones not used for
surveillance collect large amounts of environmental data. With the rise of big
data, the privacy risks associated with data collection, whether inadvertent or
otherwise, are not merely a function of the data collected by drones themselves;
the risks arise due to the impressive capabilities of data mining.
2.2.2.2 Data Mining: Facilitating Identification
Data mining, or data aggregation, involves drawing inferences from matched
disparate data sets in order to make predictions about a subject.74 With
aggregated data from multiple sources, including online sources, data mining
enables the construction of intimate dossiers of individuals by linking
individuals’ names with other intimate details, such as social security numbers,
preferences, hobbies, family, and friends.75 Of particular concern, data mining
can combine both personal and non-personal information to enable the
discovery of information that individuals are unaware that they have revealed
and may not wish to reveal, such as predictions by Facebook of a user’s
sexuality.76
Although data collection by the State has been of historical focus, the vast
majority of data mining today does not originate with the government. Today’s
world has been described as a ‘‘world of indiscriminate tracking where
[commercial enterprises] are stockpiling data about individuals at an
unprecedented pace.”77 Clearly, commercial enterprises, including Netflix,
72 Richard A. Posner, ‘‘Privacy is Overrated,” NY Daily News (28 April 2013), online:
<http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion> [Posner].
73 Bracken-Roche, supra note 3 at 47-48.
74 Holden, supra note 12 at 80.
75 Andrew Conte, ‘‘Drones with Facial Recognition Technology will end Anonymity,
Everywhere,” Business Insider (27 May 2013), online: <http://www.businessinsider.-
com> [Conte].
76 Holden, supra note 12 at 80.
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which uses data aggregation to recommend films for customers, and Amazon,
which uses data aggregation to manage its supply chain, already see the value of
this technique.
Although technology brought data aggregation to the privacy landscape,
drones have the potential to amplify the quantity and quality of data collected.
Indeed, the OPC has asserted that there is a strong argument that drones will be
‘‘surveillance game-changers” due to their attributes, payload technologies, and
their ability to collect personal information.78 With greater volumes of data,
facilitated by new types of data and new collection techniques, data mining is
further facilitated, allowing for increasingly accurate inferences to be drawn.79
By being versatile and persistent, drones also enhance the depth and quality
of data collected. Unlike manned aircraft or closed-circuit television,80 ‘‘flying
video surveillance threatens to eradicate existing practical limits on aerial
monitoring.”81 Sophisticated technology gives drones the physical ability to
track an individual’s activities and patterns of movement more persistently over
time, which has led to drones being referred to as ‘‘unblinking eyes in the sky.”82
Drones equipped with surveillance capabilities also have a distinct ability to
capture data dynamically from unique vantage points. For example, drones can
use thermal imaging devices to capture data through walls with a fine level of
detail, or biometric recognition technologies to capture the image of an
individual’s face from far away.83
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Global Hawk
Mission, which uses drones to track hurricanes, demonstrates the surveillance
power of drones. The program’s drones can fly up to 17,000 kilometres and stay
aloft for up to thirty hours, which allows them to reach and stay in stormy areas
that manned aircraft simply cannot. Using an analogy, the mission’s director
said, ‘‘if you drove by a drug dealer’s house, you wouldn’t catch him; but if you
stood there all day, you might.”84 Clearly, the persistent observation facilitated
by drones is far more invasive than casual observation.85
Although drone technology remains in its infancy, cyber experts believe that
very little — mostly research dollars — stands in the way of computers being able
77 Julia Angwin,Dragnet Nation: A Question for Privacy, Security and Freedom in aWorld
of Relentless Surveillance (New York: Time Books, 2014) at 3, as cited in Holden, supra
note 12 at 80.
78 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 10.
79 Holden, supra note 12 at 80-81.
80 Closed-circuit televisions are self-contained surveillance systems, typically used by stores
and companies: PCMag, ‘‘Encyclopedia,” online: <www.pcmag.com>.
81 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 10.
82 Ibid at 11.
83 Ibid at 11.
84 Brian Handwerk, ‘‘5 Surprising Drone Uses (Besides Pizza Delivery),” National
Geographic (6 June 2013), online: <http://news.nationalgeographic.com>.
85 Holden, supra note 12 at 69.
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to identify anyone almost instantly.86 Even if identification is not possible, or if
inadvertently captured information does not reach the threshold to be considered
part of an individual’s ‘‘biographical core,” it may be ‘‘core” to the community
with which the individual is associated. Thus, the capture of such data could have
a chilling effect on freedoms of association and of speech.87 For all of the reasons
outlined here, it is argued that drones will force the general public to sacrifice
both privacy and anonymity,88 which may have the effect of diminishing
expectations of privacy in public.
2.2.2.3 Degradation of Privacy in the Public Sphere
2.2.2.3.1 The Reasonableness of Expectations of Privacy in Public
As ‘‘drones with their arrays of sensors take to the sky,”89 their ability to
diminish privacy in public spaces has spurred debate.90 However, many people
question whether expectations of privacy in public are reasonable in the first
place. According to dominant theories of privacy, that which is private and
undisclosed warrants protection, while that which happens in public does not.
According to these theories, privacy is waived by individuals who are out in
public.91 Nevertheless, several scholars disagree, arguing that public and private
spheres cannot be so sharply distinguished, as the distinction does not reflect
common perceptions of privacy, nor how individuals behave in public.92 Instead,
it is suggested that there are degrees of public and private, depending on what is
acceptable in the context.
The OPC supports the latter approach, arguing that there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy in public. The OPC argues that while the operation of
drones is prohibited in crowded areas for safety reasons, a similar line of
reasoning should be employed with respect to privacy. In a 2015 submission to
Transport Canada, the OPC stated that ‘‘residential areas, schoolyards and
shelters, hospitals and prisons, places of worship and memorial sites — all come
to mind as spaces which, while perhaps public, carry with them some expectation
of privacy when people use [drones].”93
In Spencer, the SCC agreed, holding that privacy rights are not abandoned
the moment someone leaves the privacy of his or her home and enters a public
space.94 In Spencer, the SCC quoted R. v. Wise, where Justice La Forest stated:
86 Conte, supra note 75.
87 Bracken-Roche, supra note 3 at 47.
88 Conte, supra note 75.
89 Holden, supra note 12 at 84.
90 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 12.
91 Holden, supra note 12 at 81-82.
92 Ibid.
93 OPC - Comment to Transport Canada, supra note 69.
94 Spencer, supra note 53 at para. 44.
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[i]n a variety of public contexts, we may expect to be casually observed,
but may justifiably be outraged by intensive scrutiny. In these public
acts, we do not expect to be personally identified and subject to
extensive surveillance, but seek to merge into the ‘situational land-
scape.’95
In R. v. Wise, a driver on public roads was held to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, which was violated by ubiquitous monitoring, even
though the vehicle was in public for all to see.96 In R. v. Ward, also cited in
Spencer, Justice Doherty asserted that:
personal privacy protects an individual’s ability to function on a day-
to-day basis within society while enjoying a degree of anonymity that is
essential to the individual’s personal growth and the flourishing of an
open and democratic society.97
Clearly, the law appreciates the importance of privacy in public, recognizing
that individuals can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in public. As
Justice Doherty inferred, anonymity is central to that expectation.
2.2.2.3.2 The Right to be Anonymous
Anonymity, according to the SCC, allows individuals to preserve freedom
from identification and surveillance while in public places;98 in essence, it is the
state of being unnamed.99 In contrast to surveillance, which encourages people to
behave differently, anonymity encourages ‘‘experimentation” in public places.100
When an individual goes to the park, drives a car, or walks down the street,
movements are not concealed and there is no expectation of confidentiality; an
individual does not expect to be identified, or held to rules of behaviour that
apply in familiar contexts. Indeed, although someone may expect to be seen in
public, that person may expect any observations made about them to vanish into
history, rather than remaining on the public record.101
As noted above, the SCC in Spencer identified ‘‘privacy as anonymity” as
one of the conceptual understandings of informational privacy. In doing so,
Justice Cromwell cited the need for a broadened conception of privacy, which led
to the recognition of anonymity as a new dimension of privacy, which the SCC
applied specifically to the online context.102 The SCC emphasized that the
95 1992 CarswellOnt 71, 1992 CarswellOnt 1982, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) at 558, as
cited in Spencer, ibid at para. 44.
96 Ibid at para. 43.
97 2012 ONCA 660, 2012 CarswellOnt 12133 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 71, as cited in Spencer,
ibid at para. 48.
98 Ibid at para. 43.
99 Burow, supra note 18 at 443.
100 Hunt & Rankin, supra note 65 at 206.
101 Holden, supra note 12 at 83.
102 Spencer, supra note 53 at para. 41-42; Mayeda, supra note 4 at 62-63.
392 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [15 C.J.L.T.]
concept was not novel, as anonymity appears in various contexts, such as
anonymous surveys and literature.103 Although the SCC did not recognize a right
to anonymity per se, the SCC recognized that there ‘‘may be a privacy interest in
anonymity, depending on the circumstances.”104
Although anonymity has positive and negative dimensions,105 courts,
including the SCC in Spencer, have recognized the preservation of anonymity
as a positive feature of democracy when it promotes debate and discussion on
controversial issues.106 The Internet, for example, facilitates various positive
interactions, such as allowing access to advice on deeply personal issues,
including anorexia, self-harm, and relationship issues.107 Anonymity in public
can also be a positive feature of democracy. Surveillance drones, for example, are
argued to have a chilling effect on the right to peaceful assembly108 and a
proliferation of non-surveillance drones could have a similar effect.
2.3. Conclusions on Privacy Risks
Several factors, each impacted significantly by technology, affect the possible
degree of privacy in public spaces. The nature of surveillance is one example, as
publicly observable activities dispersed over space and time can be contrasted
with systemic observation, which can produce detailed profiles. The permanence
or impermanence of observations is also important, with impermanence referring
to transient observations made of people in public, which tend to vanish into
history. Anonymity, as discussed, is yet another factor.109
The privacy challenges posed by drones are not new, at least in kind; indeed,
the Internet, digital cameras, and mobile phone tracking present similar risks.110
However, in degree, privacy risks are amplified by drones. Drones can and will
103 Spencer, ibid at para. 41-42. Indeed, several novels have been written anonymously,
including the classic novel Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Orwell. Eric Arthur Blair, a
self-conscious man who was deeply afraid of rejection, was the true author of the novel,
but anonymity allowed him to remain ‘‘namelessly afloat in the sea of a faceless crowd”:
Burow, supra note 18 at 456-457.
104 Spencer, supra note 53 at paras. 42, 49.
105 Just as online anonymity facilitates the explorationof newdimensions of one’s identity, it
facilitates the distribution of child pornography and creates forums for hate crimes.
Anonymity has also contributed to cyberbullying, at least in part, by giving bullies the
impression that hurtful messages can be dispersed without consequence: Holden, supra
note 12 at 79; Senate, Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, 41st Parliament,
1st Session, Cyberbullying Hurts: Respect for Rights in the Digital Age (December 2012)
(Chair: Mobina S.B. Jaffer, Co-Chair: Patrick Brazeau), online: <www.parl.gc.ca> at
1, 23 [Jaffer & Brazeau].
106 See e.g. King v. Power, 2015 NLTD(G) 32, 2015 CarswellNfld 62, 364 Nfld. & P.E.I.R.
285 (Nfld. S.C.) at paras. 24-25 [King].
1078Jaffer & Brazeau, supra note 105 at 23.
108 Bracken-Roche, supra note 3 at 31.
109 Holden, supra note 12 at 83.
110 Ibid at 75.
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have the effect of diminishing privacy in public by performing systemic
observation, by eliminating the impermanence of observations through
photographs or video, and by diminishing one’s ability to remain anonymous.
3. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
As drones become more commonplace, and privacy intrusions by drones
increase, members of the public, whether operating drones or living alongside
drones, will need to understand both which behaviour offends the law and the
potential avenues for redress upon offence. For those that do suffer injury due to
privacy invasions by drones, understanding which statutory or common law
cause of action, if any, is available is key. Moreover, for the public to feel more
comfortable with the idea of drones, an awareness of potential protection is
crucial. Therefore, keeping in mind the privacy risks set out in Section 2, this
Section seeks to highlight how Canadian laws protect against those risks and
where the law falls short.
To that end, to understand the conditions in which drones can and cannot
operate, it is first necessary to consider Canada’s drone-specific laws.
Subsequently, the protection offered by Canada’s private sector privacy
legislation will be considered. Finally, property and tort law, the traditional
common law guardians of privacy, will be canvassed. As will be shown, the
current state of the law leaves much to be desired.
3.1 Civil Aviation Regulators: Tackling Drone Safety, Ignoring Privacy
Drone regulation has two licensing streams: Transport Canada, the civil
regulatory authority, and the Department of National Defence, which is the
military authority.111 Civil aviation, which is of focus here, is governed by the
Aeronautics Act112 and the Canadian Aviation Regulations.113 Additionally,
Transport Canada, which is responsible for establishing, managing, and
developing safety standards and regulations for civil aviation,114 has developed
specific regulations and guidelines governing the use of drones.115
3.1.1 Restricted Drones
Regulations governing ‘‘unmanned air vehicles” ‘‘(‘‘UAVs”),116 a category of
drone, are restrictive and onerous. Although the definition of UAV explicitly
111 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 6.
112 R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2.Note that due to the federal government’s constitutional power over
aeronautics, drones, including model aircraft, are regulated federally: See Sheehan &
Parrish, supra note 16; see also Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91;
Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10.
113 SOR/96-433 [CARs].
114 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 6.
115 Sheehan & Parrish, supra note 16; see CARs, supra note 113, ss. 101.01, 602.41, 603.65-
67, 606.02, 623.65.
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excludes model aircraft, use is of crucial importance, as model aircraft used for
non-recreational purposes, such as for work or research,117 are considered
UAVs.118 Unless an exemption applies, the CARs prohibit the operation of
UAVs without a Special Flight Operations Certificate (‘‘SFOC”),119 which
requires the approval of Transport Canada, and restricts the time, space and
purposes for which a UAV is permitted to fly.120 Importantly, penalties for flying
a UAV without an SFOC include fines of up to $5,000 for an individual and up
to $25,000 for a corporation, while penalties for failing to abide by the terms of
an SFOC include fines of up to $3,000 for an individual and up to $15,000 for a
corporation.121
In assessing SFOC applications, Transport Canada considers all aspects of
the application, including the operator’s experience, and the nature and
complexity of proposed operations. When SFOCs are granted, they are issued
for each discrete mission, initially, although longer term SFOCs may be available
with a safe operating record. Once authorized, UAV operators must
communicate with airspace controllers to coordinate their use of airspace.122
Despite these restrictions, the number of SFOCs granted per year has increased
significantly, from 293 SFOCs between 2007 and 2012, to 1,672 in 2013 alone.123
3.1.2 Drones Exempt from the CARs
As restricted drones are subject to intense regulation and scrutiny,
unrestricted drones pose a greater risk from a privacy perspective. Unrestricted
drones include both exempted UAVs124 and model aircraft falling outside of the
scope of the UAV definition (i.e., recreational drones). With respect to the
116 AUAV ‘‘means apower-driven aircraft, other than amodel aircraft, that is designed to fly
without a human operator on board”:CARs, supranote 113, s. 101.01 (emphasis added).
117 Transport Canada makes it clear that ‘‘if you fly a drone for anything other than for the
fun of flying,” theUAVwill be considered as being flown forwork or research. Examples
of non-recreational activities given include: survey work, agricultural work, inspections,
academic research, police work, and aerial photography and videography, including for
real estate: Transport Canada, ‘‘Applying for a Special Flight Operations Certificate,”
online: <https://www.tc.gc.ca>.
118 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 7.
119 CARs, supra note 113, s. 602.41.
120 Bracken-Roche, supra note 3 at 21-22.
121 Transport Canada, ‘‘Flying your Drone Safely and Legally”, online: <https://
www.tc.gc.ca>.
122 Sheehan & Parrish, supra note 16.
123 Ibid.
124 Note that model aircraft, operations by autonomous UAVs, and operations by foreign
UAV operators are specifically excluded from the scope of the exemption: Transport
Canada, Civil Aviation Standards Office, Advisory Circular No. 600-004, ‘‘Guidance
Material for Operating Unmanned Air Vehicle Systems under an Exemption” (22
December 2016), online: <https://www.tc.gc.ca> at Appendix A [2016 TC Advisory
Circular].
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former, according to Transport Canada’s 2016 Advisory Circular, there are two
categories of exempted UAVs: (i) UAVs with a maximum take-off weight of one
kilogram or less (previousy two kilograms);125 and (ii) UAVs with a maximum
take-off weight exceeding one kilogram up to and including twenty-five
kilograms.126 The latter category has a maximum speed requirement, and both
categories require the UAV to be operated within visual line-of-sight (‘‘VLOS”)
and are subject to numerous conditions.127 The existence of such exemptions is
significant as in 2014 alone, thousands of exempted UAV operations are
estimated to have been conducted; and this number is only expected to grow as
UAV technology develops.128
Exempted UAV operations are restricted or prohibited in ‘‘built-up areas,
controlled airspace, aerodromes, forest fire areas, and other restricted
locations.”129 The ‘‘built-up area” restriction in particular raises an interesting
observation. Currently, an exempt UAV is prohibited from operating within
three (previously five)130 nautical miles of a built-up area, which Transport
Canada defines as an area with ‘‘groups of buildings or dwellings including
anything from small hamlets to major cities” and ‘‘anything larger than a
farmstead.”131 There are further stipulations prohibiting, for example, the
operation of UAVs at a lateral distance of less than thirty metres (previously one
hundred fifty metres)132 from any building, structure, vehicle, vessel, animal, or
person, unless such operation relates to the subject of the aerial work and only
persons inherent in the operation are present.133
Notably, it can be inferred from Transport Canada’s Advisory Circular that
these requirements are entirely safety-related. Firstly, the Advisory Circular
suggests that the only reason UAVs cannot be operated near built-up areas is
because UAVs are not required to meet technical airworthiness requirements,
which increases safety risks to persons and property on the ground.134 Second,
the distances selected fail to prevent privacy invasions; indeed, as we have already
seen, drones have the technological capabilities to conduct surveillance from
125 Ibid; To review the recent change in weight restrictions, see the 2014 version of the TC
Advisory Circular: Transport Canada, Civil Aviation Standards Office, Advisory
Circular No. 600-004, ‘‘Guidance Material for Operating Unmanned Air Vehicle
Systems under an Exemption” (27 November 2014), online: <https://www.tc.gc.ca>,
archived at <https://perma.cc/U33W-2KZZ> [2014 TC Advisory Circular].
126 2016 TC Advisory Circular, supra note 124 at Appendix B.
127 Ibid at Appendices A-B.
128 Sheehan & Parrish, supra note 16.
129 2016 TC Advisory Circular, supra note 124 at Appendices A-B.
130 See 2014 TC Advisory Circular, supra note 125 at para. 4.2(26).
131 2016 TC Advisory Circular, supra note 124 at para. 2.3.
132 See 2014 TC Advisory Circular, supra note 125 at para. 4.2(27).
133 2016 TC Advisory Circular, supra note 124 at para. 4.2(30)
134 Ibid.
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distances greater than those prohibited. Interestingly, as highlighted above,
Transport Canada has actually decreased these distances with its most recent
Advisory Circular, as opposed to increasing them to a level that would better
protect the privacy interests of those on the ground.
3.1.1 Model Aircraft
Prior to Transport Canada’s Interim Order No. 8 Respecting the Use of
Model Aircraft,135 introduced in early 2017, the CARs merely prohibited the use
of model aircraft in manners hazardous to safety;136 accordingly, recreational
model aircraft weighing under thirty-five kilograms were left essentially
unregulated.137 Clearly, this was concerning in light of the extensive
surveillance capabilities of recreational drones, as discussed in Section 2.1.2.2,
supra. The OPC expressed concern over this gap in regulation, noting that
‘‘privacy concerns [were] notably absent in the licensing requirements or
regulations established by Transport Canada”138 and criticizing aviation
authorities for excluding model aircraft from the scope of the provisions.139 As
a result of this gap, the CARs failed to prevent individuals from employing
drones for the purposes of collecting information on public authorities, private
sector organizations, or of other individuals by ‘‘lateral surveillance.”140 Indeed,
without any form of regulation, the recreational use of camera-equipped drones
could easily infringe on property, personal, and privacy rights.141
In March 2017, the Minister of Transport, the Honourable Marc Garneau,
unveiled the aforementioned Interim Order, which took effect immediately and
which will remain in effect for up to one year until permanent regulations are put
in place.142 As a result of the Interim Order, model aircraft weighing between 250
grams and thirty-five kilograms143 are now subject to similar conditions as those
mentioned above for exempt UAVs. Specifically, model aircraft cannot be
operated at a lateral distance of less than thirty or seventy-five metres (depending
on the weight of the model aircraft) from ‘‘vehicles, vessels or the public,
135 Transport Canada, ‘‘Interim Order No. 8 Respecting the Use of Model Aircraft”,
Minister of Transport (Ottawa: TC, 16 June 2017), online: <https://www.tc.gc.ca>
[Interim Order].
136 CARs, supra note 113, s. 602.45.
137 Model aircraft weighing over thirty-five kilograms, used for any purpose, require a
SpecialFlightOperationsCertificate: 2016TCAdvisoryCircular, supranote 124 at para.
1.3(2).
138 OPC— Research Group Report, supra note 1 at 7.
139 Ibid at 5.
140 Bracken-Roche, supra note 3 at 17.
141 Baxter, supra note 26.
142 TransportCanada, ‘‘TransportCanada IntroducesMeasures toProtectCanadians from
Reckless Drone Use,” (Ottawa: TC, 16 March 2017), online: <https://canada.ca/en/
transport-canada/news>.
143 Interim Order, supra note 135, s. 3(1).
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including spectators, bystanders or any person not assicated with the operation
of the aircraft.”144 Furthermore, model aircraft must be operated within VLOS,
must be operated at least nine kilometres from any airport, cannot be operated at
night, and cannot be operated at an altitude higher than ninety metres.145
Finally, the Interim Order obliges model aircraft owners to display their name,
address, and telephone number on the exterior of the aircraft.146 Individuals that
fail to abide by the new rules may be subject to fines of up to $3,000.147
While this Interim Order is a notable improvement over the complete state of
non-regulation that existed previously, several models of consumer drones,
generally possessing cameras, weigh less than 250 grams; these models remain
unregulated, meaning the new regulations cannot effectively ‘‘curtail would-be
peeping toms.”148 Moreover, much like the SFOC exemptions, the Interim Order
is heavily, if not exclusively, focused on safety. This safety focus is demonstrated
in the Interim Order’s Preamble, which states:
[w]hereas the annexed Interim Order No. 8 Respecting the Use of Model
Aircraft is required to deal with a significant risk, direct or indirect, to
aviation safety or the safety of the public.149
Comments made at the unveiling of the Interim Order by both Garneau and
the Chief Superintendent of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police echo the same
sentiment.150
A further issue that remains post-Interim Order is the challenge of
unmasking the anonymous drone operator. Although the Interim Order’s new
requirement obliging model aircraft owners to display their name, address, and
telephone number on the device sought to address this issue, its efficacy is
questionable. Indeed, the combination of size and distance will likely make this
information unreadable to someone who wishes to report intrusive drone
activity. Prior to the Interim Order, the OPC had suggested physical plates,
painted numbers or decals, and unique signature signals, such as radio frequency
identification devices (‘‘RFID”)151 as potential alternatives.152 Laura Emmett, a
144 Ibid, s. 5(3)-(4).
145 Ibid, s. 5(1)(a), 5(5)(f).
146 Ibid, s. 8.
147 The penalty amounts are set out in column II of the schedule: See Interim Order, supra
note 135, s. 2(1).
148 Simon Cohen, ‘‘Canadian Recreational Drone Users Have Basically Been Grounded,”
Mobile Syrup (25 March 2017), online: <http://mobilesyrup.com>.
149 Interim Order, supra note 135.
150 See Transport Canada, ‘‘NewSafetyRules forRecreationalDroneUse Take Immediate
Effect” (Toronto: 16 March 2017), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-
canada/news>.
151 RFID is an identification system that relies on a small chip implanted in a tag, which can
record and store data: Office of Consumer Affairs, ‘‘Radio-Frequency Identification
(RFID) in the Retail Marketplace” (Ottawa: OCA), online: <www.ic.gc.ca>.
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legal specialist in the area, cited readability as a difficulty associated with
physical plates, but agreed with the OPC that RFID could be effective.153
Assuming identifying information is unreadable to drone observers, it will
remain unclear what can be done if a drone flies over one’s home or business, as
Emmett recognized pre-Interim Order. Even more crucially, it will remain
unclear how operators can be identified if a drone is interfering with the path of
an airliner.154 This issue is not merely academic;155 all regulators involved with
drones to date, whether dealing with issues related to safety, security, or privacy,
have recognized the need for a reliable manner by which operators can be readily
identified when problems arise.156 Unfortunately, it appears the Interim Order is
both insufficiently directed towards the privacy concerns that drones present and
inadequately equipped to ensure drone operators are held accountable where
necessary. Although new regulations are expected to replace the Interim Order in
the short term, the content of the Interim Order is presumably indicative of the
form of these future regulations, suggesting deficiencies will persist.
3.2 Protecting Privacy in a Drone Age
Although safety remains the primary issue of concern for aviation regulators,
drone operators must nonetheless abide by general laws regulating behaviour in
society, including criminal law, privacy law, property law, and tort law.
Fortunately, these laws fill some of the privacy gaps left by Transport Canada.
The latter three aforementioned categories will be discussed further in the
sections that follow.
3.2.1 Privacy Law
Canada has two primary privacy statutes, both of which the OPC is charged
with enforcing: the Privacy Act,157 which governs the personal information
handling practices of federal government departments and agencies, and the
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (‘‘PIPEDA”),158
which governs the private sector. The first difficulty with PIPEDA is the limited
scope of the information it protects. Firstly, PIPEDA does not apply to
recreational actors.159 Second, the statutory cause of action under PIPEDA is
restricted only to the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to ‘‘personal
152 OPC - Comment to Transport Canada, supra note 69.
153 Peter Nowak, ‘‘Regulation of drones in Canada has yet to take off”, Canadian Business
(27 July 2016), online: <http://www.canadianbusiness.com>.
154 Ibid.
155 OPC - Comment to Transport Canada, supra note 69.
156 Ibid.
157 R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21.
158 PIPEDA, supra note 67.
159 Holden, supra note 12 at 105.
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information”160 that is held by an organization; thus, there is no protection
conferred upon non-personal information.161
Where personal information is involved, collection, use, and disclosure
require both the knowledge and consent162 of the individual in question, ‘‘except
where inappropriate.”163 Importantly, consent is not required where collection is
for journalistic, artistic, or literary purposes.164 PIPEDA’s reliance on the
‘‘utopic”165 idea of consent has received considerable criticism, even from the
OPC.166 In a somewhat analogous activity, street-level imaging,167 satisfaction
of the consent requirement requires companies to inform citizens that they will be
photographing the streets of their city.168 Presumably, large drones can ensure
compliance by doing the same.169 Nevertheless, the OPC’s position on this
activity is both problematic for citizens who do not see the notice, as well as for
vehicles that cannot be seen, and as a result, choose to forgo compliance. High
altitude drones, which will typically be covert, are certainly problematic.170
160 Personal information is broadly defined as ‘‘information about an identifiable
individual”: PIPEDA, supra note 67, s. 2(1).
161 This contrasts with certain provincial statutory torts, which protect a broader range of
privacy intrusions, and which will be discussed in Section 3.2.4.1, below. See Eric A.
Dolden et al., ‘‘Current Landscape of Personal Information and Privacy Liability in
Canada” (February 2016) Dolden Wallace Folick LLP, online: <http://www.dolden.-
com> at 8-9.
162 Consent may be implied: PIPEDA, supra note 67, Schedule 1, s. 4.3.6; Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Captured on Camera Street-level imaging
technology, the Internet and you” (Ottawa: OPC, April 2009), online: <https://
www.priv.gc.ca> at n 1 [OPC— Street-level Technology].
163 Obtaining consent may be inappropriate, for example, where legal, medical, or security
reasons create an impossibility or impracticality with regards to obtaining consent:
PIPEDA, supra note 67, s. 5(1), Schedule 1, s. 4.3.
164 Ibid, s. 7(1)(c); Two additional examples of available exemptions include (i) collection is
in the interests of the individual and consent cannot be collected in a timely fashion; and
(ii) it is reasonable to expect that collection with knowledge or consent would
compromise the availability or accuracy of the information, in the event that collection
was reasonable for purposes relating to investigating a breach of an agreement or the
contravention of a Canadian law: Ibid, s. 7(1)(a)-(b).
165 Holden, supra note 12 at 105.
166 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Wearable Computing — Challenges
and Opportunities for Privacy Protection” (Ottawa: OPC, January 2014), online:
<https://www.priv.gc.ca> at para. 2(a) (technological developments pose ‘‘profound
challenges” to existing privacy frameworks around theworld, which are built on the idea
of consent).
167 Street-level imaging, used by Google’s Street View application, involves photographing
the streetscape, typically done by mounting a camera on a vehicle that is driven up and
down streets: OPC— Street-level Technology, supra note 162.
168 The OPC offered examples of how notice could be given, such as including visible
markings on vehicles, or notifying the media: Ibid.
169 Holden, supra note 12 at 102-104.
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Indeed, even the OPC has recognized that covert surveillance,171 an ‘‘extremely
privacy-invasive form of technology,”172 in most instances, takes place without
consent.173
With regard to protecting against privacy intrusions by drones, PIPEDA’s
enforcement scheme is also lacking. Firstly, as PIPEDA places the onus on the
individual to submit a request for information or a complaint,174 PIPEDA has
been construed as ‘‘lax” and, therefore, not ideal for regulating privacy with
respect to drones. This is particularly true, as an individual may not be aware of
ensuing surveillance or of whether personal information is being captured.175
As Transport Canada is not considering privacy as it develops drone
regulations, it is unclear precisely how PIPEDA will apply to drone operators.176
Nevertheless, as the foregoing illustrates, PIPEDA’s ability to protect privacy as
drones proliferate is certainly in question. Moreover, it is important to note that
recreational users fall outside of PIPEDA’s scope, as PIPEDA limits its
application to commercial actors. This was particularly troubling prior to the
Interim Order, discussed in Section 3.1.1, as recreational users were excluded
from regulation under both privacy legislation and civil aviation regulations;
today, however, although inadequacies remain, as discussed above, the
recreational use of drones does fall within the scope of the CARs, which
represents some improvement.
3.2.2 The Common Law
Despite the statutory deficiencies mentioned above, it is important to
remember that the common law governs the acts of all drone operators, as does
criminal law. Although criminal law is beyond the scope of this paper, property
torts, including trespass and nuisance, as well as the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion, offer recourse to those that suffer privacy invasions as a consequence
of drones and their surveillance capabilities. These areas of the law and the
protection that they do and do not offer will briefly be considered here.
170 Ibid at 104.
171 There seem to be few instances in which drones would meet the OPC’s requirements for
performing covert surveillance at high altitudes, which suggests that such drone usage is
inconsistentwithPIPEDA. However, it is considered surprising thatPIPEDA allows for
covert surveillance in any event: See ibid at 102-103; See also Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Guidance on Covert Video Surveillance in the Private
Sector” (Ottawa: OPC,May 2009), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca> [OPC—Covert
Surveillance].
172 Ibid.
173 OPC— Covert Surveillance, supra note 171 at B.
174 See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘File a Complaint under PIPEDA”
(Ottawa: OPC, October 2016), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca>
175 Bracken-Roche, supra note 3 at 58.
176 Holden, supra note 12 at 104.
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3.2.3 Property Torts: Trespass & Nuisance
Although property law provides some recourse in the event of a drone
entering the airspace above private property, serious deficiencies exist in this
domain as well. Beyond the complications associated with substantiating claims
in trespass and nuisance,177 standing to sue requires either ownership or exclusive
possession.178 Thus, property law offers no recourse for surveillance activities
that occur in public, which are likely to be frequent in the case of drones. These
torts also offer no assistance to those who are not property holders. For those
that do have standing, further ambiguity awaits; although the viability of
property-related claims depends on the extent and nature of the property rights
held, airspace property rights have yet to be precisely defined.179
As aircraft have historically flown at higher altitudes, few Canadian courts
have had the opportunity to consider the extent and nature of rights in airspace
at lower altitudes. Taking an approach later affirmed by the leading Canadian
case on the subject,180 in Bernstein of Leigh (Baron) v. Skyviews & General Ltd.,
the English Queen’s Bench confirmed that airspace property rights are not
without limit. Concluding that the defendants had not trespassed while taking a
single aerial photograph of the plaintiff’s country home, Justice Griffiths held
that restricting airspace property rights to ‘‘such height as it is necessary for the
ordinary use and enjoyment of his land and the structures upon it”181 was most
appropriate. In his opinion, such a limitation balanced individual property rights
with the right of the general public to take advantage of technology.
In accordance with that reasoning, in Canada, the U.S. and the United
Kingdom, airspace property rights182 have been described as: (i) extending to the
‘‘immediate reaches” of the surface; (ii) including as much airspace as the surface
owner can use or occupy; and (iii) extending as far as necessary to ensure the
surface owner’s full enjoyment of the land.183 Although property rights in
airspace are clearly not unlimited, where precisely airspace becomes part of the
public domain is uncertain.184 This has created ‘‘pervasive uncertainty as to
177 Trespass, unauthorized interference with possession, allows both owners and lessees to
make claims for intentional intrusions, even without demonstrating harm. Private
nuisance, on the other hand, is unreasonable interference with one’s use or enjoyment of
land and does require harm, but not fault: Ibid at 88-89.
178 Butler, supra note 11 at 444.
179 Holden, supra note 12 at 84.
180 SeeDidow v. Alberta Power Ltd., 1988ABCA257, 1988CarswellAlta 109 (Alta. C.A.) at
para. 41 [Didow].
181 [1978] 1 Q.B. 479, [1977] 2 All E.R. 902 (U.K. H.C.) at 488 [Bernstein].
182 Note that airspace rights have been discussed in the context of power pole intrusions,
usingDidow as an example, as opposed to in the context of aircraft intrusions. Thus, the
reasoning may be obiter: Holden, supra note 12 at 85.
183 Ibidat 85; See generallyLacroix v.R., 1953CarswellNat 272, [1954]Ex.C.R. 69 (Can.Ex.
Ct.) at 73; Bernstein, supra note 181 at 488; Didow, supra note 180 at para. 8.
184 Holden, supra note 12 at 85-88.
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where drones may and may not fly.”185 As property rights have only been found
in airspace up to twenty metres above the land’s surface in Canada,186 property
law may be incapable of capturing intrusions by even recreational drones, which
can fly far higher. Accordingly, property law seems deficient in a world with
drones; particularly as drones will inevitably, and imminently, fly at high
altitudes and in areas where airspace property rights are non-existent, such as
over public streets.
3.2.4 Actionable Privacy Rights
3.2.4.1 The Tort of Intrusion Upon Seclusion
As noted earlier, various common law causes of action have long protected
privacy.187 Despite the fact that courts were willing to protect privacy invasions
by ‘‘pressing other nominate causes of action into service,”188 Canadian courts189
were hesitant to recognize invasion of privacy as an independently actionable
wrong; thus, invasion of privacy remained ‘‘an inceptive, if not ephemeral, legal
concept, primarily operating to extend the margins of existing tort doctrine.”190
Although privacy was protected indirectly, Chris DL Hunt, a widely-published
academic with expertise in privacy law, argues that this resulted in a
‘‘hodgepodge” approach to privacy, which left several gaps in protection.191
In 2012, the ONCA recognized a need to adapt to the changing needs of
society, as Warren & Brandeis had called for over a century prior.192 With that
realization, the ONCA created a new privacy tort in Jones: the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion. Although the Charter only protects privacy rights vis-à-vis the
State, and thus does not directly apply to private litigation,193 the ONCA
justified the creation of this new tort due to Canadian law’s ‘‘explicit recognition
185 Troy A. Rule, ‘‘Airspace in an Age of Drones” (2015) 90:155 BUL Rev at 170, 174.
186 See Didow, supra note 180.
187 Jones, supra note 6 at para. 15.
188 Hunt, supra note 49 at 184.
189 Note that this generalization excludes Quebec, a province which has historically been
progressive in the area of privacy law. For an overview of the development of Quebec’s
privacy legislation, and Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, which
expressly grants to each person an actionable right to privacy, see generally Paul-André
Comeau & André Ouimet, ‘‘Freedom of Information and Privacy: Quebec’s Innovative
Role in North America” (1995) 80 Iowa L Rev 651.
190 Ontario (Attorney General) v. Dieleman, 1994 CarswellOnt 151, 117 D.L.R. (4th) 449
(Ont. Gen. Div.) at 688, as cited in Jones, supra note 6 at para. 15.
191 Hunt, supra note 49 at 184.
192 See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8.
193 The Charter applies to the legislative, executive and administrative branches of
government: Charter, supra note 46, s. 32; See Dolphin Delivery Ltd. v. R.W.D.S.U.,
Local 580, 1986 CarswellBC 411, 1986 CarswellBC 764, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.) at
paras. 40-41, 48 [Dolphin Delivery].
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of a right to privacy as underlying specific Charter rights and freedoms, and the
principle that the common law should be developed in a manner consistent with
Charter values.”194
Rather than adopting the reasonable expectation of privacy test as used in
Charter jurisprudence, the statutory torts of other Canadian provinces, and in
England,195 Ontario’s tort of intrusion upon seclusion is primarily based on the
U.S. Restatement approach.196 To protect an interest that ‘‘closely tracks” that of
informational privacy,197 as developed in Charter litigation,198 Jones defined the
key features of the cause of action as follows:
[f]irst, that the defendant’s conduct must be intentional, within which I
would include reckless; second that the defendant must have invaded,
without lawful justification, the plaintiff’s private affairs or concerns;
and third, that a reasonable person would regard the invasion as highly
offensive causing distress, humiliation or anguish.199
Although the name of the tort, namely, its use of ‘‘seclusion,” suggests that
privacy interests must be ‘‘secluded” from public view to warrant protection, as
required by the Restatement, Hunt argues that Justice Sharpe’s formulation, as
set out above, infers that a broad interpretation was intended,200 which would
protect privacy interests in public.201 Nevertheless, he recognizes that the Court’s
references to seclusion could undermine the tort’s future effectiveness.202
The difficulty, with the respect to the test set out above, lies in proving the
third element: a ‘‘highly offensive” intrusion.203 Such an intrusion was defined as
194 John D. R. Craig, “Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: The Common Law Tort
Awakens” (1997), 42 McGill LJ 355, as cited in Jones, supra note 6 at para. 46.
195 Although England does not have a discrete privacy tort for intrusions, England uses a
reasonable expectation test for its modified breach of confidence tort, now described as
the tort of misuse of private information: See Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd.,
[2008]EWHC1777 (QB) (U.K.H.C.) at para. 7, as cited in Jones, supranote 6 at para. 62.
196 ChrisD.L.Hunt, ‘‘NewZealand’sNewPrivacyTort inComparativePerspective” (2013)
13:OUCLJ 157 at 160 [Hunt — NZ].
197 Recall that informational privacy refers to three distinct, although overlapping interests:
privacy as secrecy, privacy as control, and privacy as anonymity: See Section 2.2.1.1.1
supra; See also Spencer, supra note 53 at para. 38.
198 Jones, supra note 6 at para. 66.
199 Ibid at para. 71.
200 Chris D.L. Hunt, ‘‘Privacy in the Law: A Critical Appraisal of the Ontario Court of
Appeal’s Decision in Jones v. Tsige” (2012) 37:2 Queen’s LJ 661 at 671 [Hunt — Jones].
201 Hunt argues that privacy interests should be protected in public, as reasoning suggesting
otherwise is ‘‘obviously specious.” To him, if one loses privacy protection for venturing
out in public by impliedly consenting to foreseeable intrusions, this is akin to losing
property rights in baggage on an airplane, as bags commonly get lost in transit: Hunt—
NZ, supra note 196 at 160-61.
202 This is unlikely, however, as the SCC, the New Zealand Court of Appeal, the House of
Lords, and the English Court ofAppeal have rejected a strict seclusion requirement: Ibid
at 677.
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an invasion ‘‘into matters such as one’s financial or health records, sexual
practices and orientation, employment, diary or private correspondence that,
viewed objectively on the reasonable person standard, can be described as highly
offensive.”204 In Jones, this standard was met by a bank employee that viewed
someone’s financial records over 174 times. Importantly, this standard differs
from statutory privacy torts adopted in British Columbia, Saskatchewan,
Newfoundland, and Manitoba,205 which explicitly state that privacy may be
violated by surveillance.206 Seemingly, these provinces offer a better chance for
recovery.207
While statutory and common law torts are considered the strongest existing
causes of action with respect to privacy intrusions by drones,208 there exists an
important deficiency: the combination of the cost of litigation and the nominal
nature of damages likely to be awarded. In Jones, the ONCA awarded a mere
$10,000 in damages, as Justice Sharpe made it clear that general damages were to
serve a ‘‘symbolic purpose,” and aggravated and punitive damages were only to
be awarded in exceptional circumstances.209 In contrast, where an ex-boyfriend
posted an intimate video of the 18-year old plaintiff without her consent,
$100,000 was awarded, with $25,000 being punitive in nature.210 Nevertheless,
these awards are likely to be dwarfed by the costs of litigation, taking this remedy
out of reach for many.
203 Hunt has criticized this ‘‘highly intrusive” requirement because privacy is inherently a
dignity-based interest, which means all privacy interferences undermine a plaintiff’s
dignity.He further argues that the issue of ‘‘unduly sensitive litigants,”which the ‘‘highly
offensive” requirement is designed to preclude, is mitigated by a reasonable expectation
of privacy test such as that used in the criminal/Charter context: Ibid at 164-65.
204 Jones, supra note 6 at para. 72.
205 SeePrivacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373 [B.C. Privacy Act]; Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-
24; Privacy Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. P-22; The Privacy Act, C.C.S.M., c. P125 [Manitoba
Privacy Act].
206 See e.g., B.C. Privacy Act, supra note 205, s. 1(4); Manitoba Privacy Act, supra note 205,
s. 3(a).
207 In British Columbia, for example, successful statutory tort actions that are more
analogous to potential drone surveillance include instances involving surveillance by
landlords directed at a specific tenant, video recordings in bathrooms, as well as claims
involving two-way mirrors and peep holes: Holden, supra note 12 at 95.
208 Ibid at 105.
209 Jones, supra note 6 at paras. 88-90.
210 Jane Doe 464533 v. D. (N.), 2016 ONSC 541, 2016 CarswellOnt 911 (Ont. S.C.J.) at
paras. 50-53 [JaneDoe]. Note that JaneDoewas decided on summary judgment, after the
defendant was noted in default. Importantly, this matter is set to be re-heard, as the
defendant successfully applied for the default judgment to be set aside, and the plaintiff
was unsuccessful in her appeal of that order: See JaneDoe 464533 v.D. (N.), 2017ONSC
127, 2017 CarswellOnt 163 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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3.3 Conclusions on Protection
The foregoing demonstrates that the current legal framework leaves
numerous gaps with respect to the protection of privacy from drone
intrusions. Recreational drones, although now regulated by the CARs, remain
outside of PIPEDA’s scope. Furthermore, recreational drones weighing less than
250 grams, which are not subject to the CARs, may be able to escape prosecution
under property torts by merely flying over 20 metres in height, which they are
seemingly capable of doing.211 For SFOC-exempted commercial drones,
although covert surveillance is only technically permitted in very limited
circumstances, the fact that the onus is on members of the public to complain
under PIPEDA appears to give drone operators significant leeway to operate
covertly.
Moreover, while drone operators in Ontario may escape liability for
surveillance completely because it is insufficiently offensive, assuming potential
plaintiffs can even afford litigation, most crucially, there are numerous provinces
in Canada without privacy torts at all: either statutory or common law. As courts
in other provinces have been reluctant to follow in Ontario’s footsteps,212 it
seems there is simply no privacy protection for intrusions in public places in
those provinces. Indeed, the ‘‘hodgepodge” of common law causes of action that
have historically protected privacy rights lack privacy protection as a core value,
and are subject to several internal limitations.213 For many, it seems there is
simply no cause of action to be had.
4. CONCLUSION
In 1890, Warren & Brandeis recognized the need for privacy protection in
response to technological advancements.214 While Jones represents one manner
by which the common law has evolved to address privacy concerns, at least in
one Canadian province,215 there is a clear need for the legislature to anticipate
and proactively address the privacy concerns posed by drones on multiple fronts.
Not only have the CARs been developed without regard for privacy concerns,
critically, Transport Canada’s regime for the identification of drones appears to
211 See e.g. the Walkera Rodeo drone, which weighs less than 250 grams and has an 800-
metre range, as discussed in Section 2.1.2.2, supra.
212 AmandaWinters, ‘‘OnFinal: I spy:Drones and privacy law,”WingsMagazine (3March
2016), online: <https://www.wingsmagazine.com>.
213 For example, data protection regimes do not protect those acting for a journalistic
purpose, defamation, malicious falsehood, and breach of confidence requires disclo-
sures, while trespass to the person is not available without physical touch, and property
torts are only available for property holders: See Hunt, supra note 49 at 181-183, 184.
214 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8.
215 See also Jane Doe, supra note 210 at paras. 41-46 (a further tort was tentatively
recognized for the public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, but the case is set to be
re-heard after judgment was set aside).
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be inadequate, which precludes accountability. Notably, even Transport Canada,
previously a world leader in the development of regulations for the commercial
use of drones, has acknowledged its inability to keep pace with the rapid
development of drone technology and the growing demand for commercial drone
usage.216
Today, technology is threatening privacy to the ‘‘point of surrender.”217 Just
as computers have been recognized as a ‘‘multi-faceted instrumentality without
precedent in our society,”218 so too will be drones. Indeed, Transport Canada is
pushing forward to integrate all forms of drones into society.219 Over time, our
legal system has evolved, and must continue to evolve, to address privacy
concerns and the inadequacy of our laws. As this paper makes clear, with respect
to drones, the shortfalls are many. Drones will undoubtedly challenge our legal
system, particularly with respect to protecting privacy in public and truly
defining what is anonymity and whether anonymity is even possible to protect in
a world with drones.
In Kentucky, a father shot down a drone caught spying on his daughter.220
While this precise scenario is unlikely to play out in the Canadian context,
Canadian residents have already attempted to investigate the activities of drones
without being able to find the appropriate government department to call.221 As
the Canadian Government has made it clear that it wishes to take advantage of
the economic opportunities presented by the digital age,222 the onus is on our
legislators to ensure that members of the public, drone operators or otherwise,
are protected by laws, aware of the laws, and have access to a remedy where
required.
216 Sheehan & Parrish, supra note 16.
217 PeterBurns, ‘‘TheLawandPrivacy:TheCanadianExperience” (1976)CanBarRev 1, as
cited in Jones, supra note 6 at para. 67.
218 A.D.Gold, “Applying Section 8 in theDigitalWorld: Seizures andSearches”, (Prepared
for the 7th Annual Six-Minute Criminal Defence Lawyer, Law Society of Upper
Canada, Toronto, 9 June 2007) at para. 3.
219 Baxter, supra note 26.
220 Ibid.
221 Bracken-Roche, supra note 3 at 4.
222 Government of Canada, ‘‘New Law to Protect the Personal Information of Canadians
Online” (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 18 June 2015), online: <http://news.gc.ca>.
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